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3.1 Introduction 
In my first two articles,  I have illustrated the pioneering work of Hermann 
Dooyeweerd and Fernando Canale as they analyzed the realm and  operation 
of human rational activities. An understanding of Dooyeweerd's analysis of 
theoretical thought and Canale's phenomenological investigation into human 
Reason sets a starting point for a much-needed critical investigation into the 
field of academic methodologies in general and the multifarious exegetical 
methods as they are applied in the field of today's biblical studies in specific.
1
2
In order to gain better insight in the structural understanding of theoretical 
thought/Reason, the third article of this series will examine Dooyeweerd's 
and Canale's work from a different angle: on one side, I will show how their 
frameworks have been used as an analytic tool to critically inquire into theory 
building and data interpretation; on the other, I will describe the differences of 
their focus and analysis. Both the focus on the use-oriented benefit and the 
focus on comparing Dooyeweerd's and Canale's philosophical thinking will set 
the stage for a meaningful critique of their work. Such a critique will be part of 
my fourth and final article where I try to enhance and unify both works into a 
meaningful format, in which this format will not only function as an expedient 
framework for an in-depth criticism of biblical methodologies, but also as a 
grid for the development of a biblical methodology that does justice to both 
the complexity of the biblical data and the biblical hermeneutical horizon. 
3 .2  Appl i ca t ion  o f  the  Ana ly s i s  o f  Theore t i ca l  
Thought/Reason 
3.2.1 Dooyeweerd 
Using his critique of theoretical thought, Dooyeweerd extensively analyzed 
various   philosophical   traditions  and  scientific trends,  but  did  not  spell  out  in 
1Oliver Glanz, "Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological 
Methodology, Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason," AUSS 47 (2009): 5-35; idem, 
"Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological Methodology, Part 
II: Canale on Reason," AUSS 47 (2009): 217-240. 
2See the introduction of Glanz, "Part 1: Dooyeweerd on Reason." 
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detail how it can be used as a methodology for critical analysis in detail. In 
his article, "De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie en de strijd der 
faculteiten" (the relation between philosophy and theology and the controversy 
between the departments) we can gain an idea of how Dooyeweerd himself applied 
his structural analysis in his critique of theology. As theology is also a 
discipline of theoretical thought, its place in Dooyeweerd's article can be 
exchanged for any other science. Here his article will serve as a starting 
point for revealing the methodological steps such a transcendental critique 
demands. 
In his article, Dooyeweerd shows that theology is characterized by the 
attitude of theoretical thinking like any other science. Thus one implication is 
that theology must choose an Archimedean standpoint  just as any other 
science must do. Therefore, the content of its Archimedean standpoint is not of 
a theological, i.e., theoretical character, but a religious character.  A second 
implication is that theology reflects one of the many Gegenstand-relations: the 
opposition of the logical modal aspect and the modal aspect of faith.  In 
Dooyeweerd's structural analysis of theoretical thought, theology cannot be 
understood as a means to come to true knowledge of God and the self as 
traditionally believed. Such knowledge is of a supratheoretical character and 
can only be obtained by reading the Holy Scriptures with the involvement of the 
human heart, which is of supratemporal character. This reading process is further in 
need of the guidance of the Holy Spirit.  Therefore, theology as bound to man's 
temporal theoretical thinking cannot claim infallibility or superiority over any 
other science. Between the central biblical starting point and the scientific 
discipline of theology as dogmatic theology, a necessary philosophical expression of 
a starting point that functions as a foundation is to be found, guaranteeing a 
theoretical, total view for all the possible Gegenstand-relations that man can involve 






From this Archimedean standpoint, it is possible to formulate an idea of 
the totality of meaning by which philosophical thought receives an insight into 
the totality of the modal diversity of coherence. This insight gives all the 
special sciences, among which is theology, their proper place and sphere. Thus 
to be able to do biblical theology, we are in need of a biblical philosophy 
3H. Dooyeweerd, "De Verhouding Tussen Wijsbegeerte En Theologic En De Strijd Der 
Faculteiten," Philosophia reformata: organ van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische  Wijsbegeerte 23 
(1958): 1-2. 
4An explanation of the term can be found in Glanz,  "Part I:  Dooyeweerd on Reason," 
31. 
5Dooyeweerd, 19. 
6An overview of the different modal aspects and the Gegenstandsrelation can be found in 
Glanz, "Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason," 19-20, 29-30, §§1.2.3 and 1.3.2.1.  
7Dooyeweerd, 3.
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that is fully dependent on the biblical ground-motive the self identifies 
with.8 Giving insight into the modal diversity is the object of philosophical 
thinking, not of any specific science, which is unable to look beyond its own 
sphere. Since good science can only be done when the total temporal horizon 
and its inner relation is laid bare, without philosophy the performance of 
nonreductionistic relative science is impossible, as all sciences are in danger of 
finding their transcendental idea within its Gegenstand-relation. 
According to Dooyeweerd, philosophy is thus not a "vakwetenschap" 
(i.e., specific scientific discipline), which searches its object of study within a 
certain aspect, but "Zij is veeleer de wetenschap der wetenschappelijke 
principia" (She [philosophy] is rather the science of the principles of 
science) .9
Continuing in this line of thought, a methodological analysis of thought 
should investigate the following specific levels of content: 
1. the level of the religious starting point that contains the three 
transcendental ideas of coherence, unity, and origin; 
2. the level of the expression of the philosophical total view of reality; 
3. the level of a specific science characterized by its Gegenstand-relation. In 
a critical analysis of thought, one can structure different expressions 
according to these three levels, while still being aware that thought constructions 
can be complex and not always reducible to these categories. 
Total-view thoughts enable the transcendental analysis to uncover the 
content of the transcendental ideas because total-view thoughts determine 
the understanding of the structural datum. To be able to uncover the total- 
view perspective, the transcendental idea of origin needs to be found. As 
the first and second ways of Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique have 
shown, theoretical thinking, including theoretical synthesis, must assume a 
transcendental idea of origin. Since, I believe, the discovery of the radical 
dependence of philosophy on an idea of origin is most fruitful and will 
also give access to the idea of coherence and unity in the critical analysis of 
theoretical concepts, I will focus on the idea of origin. Along with Roy A. 
Clouser, a philosopher in the Dooyeweerdian tradition, I understand the idea of 
origin as a primary belief and as a tool for methodological analysis. Clouser detects 
a noetic and an antic sense of primary beliefs as the starting point of theoretical 
thinking. The noetic sense concerns the order of beliefs. A belief is primary when 
it functions as a necessary presupposition of another belief and does not 
itself presuppose yet another belief.  The ontic sense concerns the 10
8Ibid., 15. 
9Dooyeweerd, 84. 
10Roy A. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of 
Religious Belief in Theories, rev. ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2005), 
15-16.
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order of reality: “In this sense one belief is primary with respect to another 
when the object of the secondary belief is taken to depend on the object of 
the primary belief for its reality?”11
The two senses of primacy (noetic and ontic) show that the idea of 
origin functions as an argumentative axiom and as generating a concept of 
reality. Noetic and ontic primacies are respectively responsible for the order of 
arguments and the order of the being-diversity. 
The source of the multitude of different theoretical understandings is 
found in the different primary beliefs. A transcendental critique must therefore 
search for that which is supposed to exist independently from everything else, 
having “unconditional independent reality.”12
There are two types of hypotheses occurring in science and philosophy that can 
help to uncover implicit primary beliefs. One is the “entity-hypothesis,” an 
intellectual guess that postulates the existence of an underlying hidden reality 
that fills in the missing links in the observational data and that helps to make 
sense of the data.  Most helpful, however, is the “perspective-hypothesis,” a 
proposed perspective on the arrangement of all structural data.  Hypotheses 
are helpful because they are our own inventions and therefore inspired by the 
understanding of ourselves in our sharing in a specific idea of origin, that 
functions as primary unconditional independent reality 
13
14
The hermeneutical questions of a critique of theoretical thought should 
therefore be What kind of relations can be found in the presentation of the 
structural data? and How do properties of one kind produce properties of 
another kind in this theory? By means of these questions, thinkers have made so-
called priority assignments that reveal the idea of origin a thinker has 
chosen. 
3 . 2 . 2  C a n a l e ' s  A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
Structural Analysis of Reason 
In Canale’s view, the diversity of interpretations of a certain subject matter 
does not necessarily result from faulty reasoning or evidence. The structure of 
Reason makes us understand that the differently chosen dimensionalities of 
Reason partly determine the specific interpretational result. Thus truly 
understanding and overcoming disagreement requires an analysis and 
evaluation of the deeper presuppositions behind interpretations. 
On the basis of his formal structure of Reason and the resulting 
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the methodological application of his structural analysis. Here I will give a 
short description of his suggested procedure to analyze interpretations. 
3.2.2.1 The Subject-Object Relation 
As Point of Departure 
The subject-object relation, as the most foundational structure of Reason, 
functions as the point of departure for the analysis of different interpretations.
Human understanding moves from the interpreting subject to the issue or 
thing that is interpreted. The human act of interpretation therefore has a 
beginning, a movement, and an end. The beginning is represented by the 
subject and its chosen interpretational perspective (presuppositions); the end is 
represented by the issue (contained or expressed by the object) or object.  
Consequently, the movement is the process by which the subject interprets 




Canale understands the subject-object relation as a methodological one.  All 
knowledge, structured by the subject-object relationship, is thus the result of 
method as action. Method as action implies that method has the basic 
structure of action involving cause and condition. Action cannot take place 
without being caused or without certain conditions.  The "cause" of the 
hermeneutical method is found in the subject. The subject's causation is 
however not autonomous but dependent on and conditioned by the object. 
Canale detects three aspects that condition any method-action: the material, 
the final, and the formal. The material aspect represents the data that are to be 
researched to understand a certain subject matter. The material aspect is the 
material object under study; it is the object's condition of the method-action. 
The final aspect represents the specific subject matter that the subject tries to 
understand. Different subject matters can be approached with the study of a 




15Fernanclo Luis Canale,  "Evangelical Theology and Open Theism:  Toward  a 
Biblical  Understanding  of  the  Macro  Hermeneutical  Principles of  Theology?"   Enfoques 
26/1 (2004): 5. 
16Ibid. 
17Fernando Luis Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology? In Search of 
a Working Proposal," Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie and Religionsphilosophie 
43/4 (2001): 370-371. 
18Ibid., 370-375. 
19Using Dooyeweerd's terminology, one could say that the subject matter can be both of 
naive (the object of the subject would be the object as thing in its entirety) and of theoretical 
character (the object of the subject would be an aspect of the object as Gegenstand).
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used in order to process the material or data. The formal side is the subject 
side's condition of the method-action. 
The variety of methods (ways) stems from the aspects of methodological 
conditioning (material, final, and formal). For the sake of clarity, Canale 
distinguishes two categories of variety: structural variety and hermeneutical 
variety. The structural variety of methods is needed in order to do justice to 
the diversity of objects (material aspect) and subject matters (final aspect). 
The hermeneutical variety of methods points to the formal aspect of any 
act-condition. The formal aspect as the hypothetical character of Reason's 
structure lies fully on the subjective side as the subject's contribution to the subject-
object relation. The hermeneutical variety originates from the different 
interpretations of hermeneutical principles. One could say that the formal 
aspect does not specifically belong to the essence of a scientific discipline, but to 
the very essence of human thinking. 
Consequently, the formal aspect of act-condition does not only include 
the interpretation of Reason's frameworks, but also the understanding 
of the ground of Being as a dimensionality of Reason. Canale calls this 
foundational ontological level "system," the broadest and all-encompassing 
concept, which is synonymous with the "ground of Being." The system is the 
ultimate horizon and ground for the development of any paradigm. Canale, 
Küng, and others understand "paradigm" to be the interpretation of Reason's 
frameworks. There are thus two important theoretical distinctions, referring to 
two presuppositional levels, to be made in the formal aspect: the formal level 
of system and the formal level of paradigm.20
On the level of the system, i.e. foundational ontology, there is the formal 
condition of Reason, i.e., "systematism," and the material interpretation 
of this formal condition, i.e., "system." The formal condition of Reason 
expresses the systematic nature of Reason as Reason's dimensionality. We 
are confronted with this systematic nature at the very moment we arrange 
the available data into a system according to a principle. The systematism of 
Reason expresses its formal side by the need for a principle of arrangement 
and by the arrangement of a coherent view of the data observed. In order to 
arrange the experience of the subject-object relation into a coherent system, 
the articulation of a grounding Idea (i.e., a concept of Being) is needed. 
On the level of the paradigm, we also find the formal condition, i.e., 
"methodological matrix," and a material interpretation of this formal 
condition, i.e., "paradigm." 
The formal condition of the paradigm needs an understanding of how 
knowing functions (epistemology), what can be known (ontology), and 
what creates coherence between the two (theology), in order to have a clear 
viewpoint for the interpretational endeavor. This formal side or matrix needs 
2 0 Ib id . ,  204 -205 .  
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a realization or interpretation out of which methodologies can be developed 
for the different subject-object relations. 
In analyzing any understanding, whether of a scientific, philosophical, or 
naive character, one needs to distinguish the three conditional aspects of 
method.  The relation between the final and the material aspect is of great 
importance. The chosen object of study provides a specific subject matter 
that can give a hint about what kind of formal aspect is involved.  Further, 
awareness of the two different levels of the formal aspect, system, and 
paradigm, provides orientation in the analysis of scientific results. 
21
22
The hermeneutical analysis must first uncover the final and material 
aspects and then search for the underlying paradigm of the methodology.  
Understanding the epistemological, ontological, and theological perspectives 
of the paradigm and their deterministic influence on the data within the 
conditions of the final and material inputs, the analysis proceeds by searching 
the foundational ontology that undergirds the paradigm. 
23
According to Canale, the various sciences with their various subject 
matters need to share the same interpretation of systematism and matrix if 
they want to create real unity within structural diversity." This call for 
presupposidonal unity is urgent, as the differentiations and specializations 
of scientific disciplines increase." The urgency of an interdisciplinary matrix 
built upon the same understanding of systematism and matrix intensifies in 
the face of growing ideological diversity due to scientific fragmentation. As 
the ideological diversity increases, the structural diversity is in danger of 
losing its independence and justification. A unified basic ontological 
foundation is needed in order not to lose the coherent structural diversity, i.e., 
the interdisciplinary connections between the different scientific enterprises. 
3.2.3 Summary 
We  can  see  tha t  accord ing  to  bo th  Dooy eweerd  and  Cana le ,  any  
understanding, but here explicitly scientific and philosophical understanding, 
has a hermeneutical nature that hints at the presuppositional levels brought 
by the subject or self. No science is able to use philosophy uncritically for 
its development of methodologies, since philosophical thinking needs to 
involve itself in a transcendental idea (Dooyeweerd) or the interpretation of 
the formal conditions of Reason (Canale). Similarly to Canale, Dooyeweerd 
 
21Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology?" 371-375. 
22Fernando Luis Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive 
Foundation of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 2001), 11-17. 
23Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology?" 387-389.  
24Ibid., 375-387. 
25Ibid., 389. 
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can therefore say: "Theology is in need of a radical self-critique as to its 
philosophical fundamentals."  To both thinkers, the question is not whether 
theology should have a philosophical foundation but whether the philosophical 
foundation of theology has a biblical or nonbiblical nature. 
26
3.3 Comparison between Dooyeweerd 
and Canale 
A comparison between Dooyeweerd and Canale on all levels is not possible. 
The reason is that Canale has not yet developed a complex philosophy such as 
Dooyeweerd's in his New Critique.27
Canale's philosophical work focuses on the phenomenological analysis of 
Reason and a biblical interpretation of foundational ontology Aside 
from a short outline in his dissertation, Canale has not yet developed an 
actual interpretation of Reason's frameworks, especially an ontology and 
epistemology, within the setting of a temporal foundational ontology. 
Thus the area of comparison is limited and much of Dooyeweerd's 
work cannot be included in a comparison. Still, a comparison on the level 
of transcendental presuppositions promises to be very fruitful as both 
Dooyeweerd and Canale accept transcendental presuppositions as basic and 
determinative. 
3.3.1 The Necessity of Discovering 
Transcendental Presuppositions 
Both Dooyeweerd and Canale try to find the most important reasons for the 
diversity of philosophical and theological schools within the formal structure 
of the philosophical and scientific thought-activity itself. On one hand, 
this formal structure reveals the supratemporal character of the necessary 
transcendental ideas (Dooyeweerd) and, on the other, the formal structure 
reveals the hypotheticity of Reason's hermeneutical presuppositions (Canale). 
Both thinkers unite in the claim that an understanding of the inner structure of 
humanity's intellectual activity (theoretical thought/Reason) is promising as it 
delivers a deeper understanding of the diversity of positions. Insight in this 
inner structure, they believe, can lead to mutual understanding and dialogue 
between different schools and traditions of thought.28
The discovery of the presuppositional structure of man's intellectual 
activity leads both Dooyeweerd and Canale to the conclusion that neither 
26Dooyeweerd, 21. Cf. Canale, "Evangelical Theology and Open Theology and Open 
Theism," 68-70. 
27 H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 4 vols. (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1997). 
28Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 400. 
INVESTIGATING  THE PRESUPPOSITIONAI. R E A L M …, PART III 63
theoretical thought/Reason nor any other human faculty can be considered 
autonomous. 
3.3.1.1 Reason and Thinking—Knowledge 
Whereas Canale analyzes Reason, Dooyeweerd analyzes theoretical thought. 
While Canale understands Reason as all-encompassing, Dooyeweerd 
considers theoretical thinking as limited in scope. Canale understands Reason as 
basic Knowledge that springs from a subject-object relation, Dooyeweerd 
understands theoretical thought as an act that strives for theoretical synthesis to 
dissolve the antithetical character of the Gegenstand-relation. 
While Canale makes the generation of any knowledge (specific and 
general) central to his analysis, Dooyeweerd critically inquires about the 
generation of theoretical concepts. As Canale does not offer an elaborate 
insight into the difference between scientific and naive thinking, a comparison 
with Dooyeweerd's understanding of theoretical thought is difficult. 
Nevertheless, an interesting comparison on the understanding of the term 
"knowledge" is possible and helpful. 
Although Dooyeweerd does not explicitly conceptualize knowledge, N. 
G. Geertsema tries to uncover which concept may be assumed on the basis of 
Dooyeweerd's thought.  On the basis of Geertsema's study, further points of 
agreement and disagreement regarding the understanding of knowledge of the 
two thinkers can be found. 
29
As explained, Dooyeweerd and Canale do not see the subject-object 
relation as problematic. They do not see a fundamental gap between subject 
and object or between the human being and the thing to be understood. 
Dooyeweerd understands the subject-object and subject-subject relations as 
meaningful, i.e., interdependent. Meaning-being implies living in relationship in 
a horizontal and vertical sense. In Canale's thought, there is no meaning 
outside of a subject-object relationship, since it is only on the basis of a 
subject-object relationship that meaning can be generated. To Canale, this fact is 
not grounded in an interpretation of the phenomenological structure, but is a 
structural necessity of the phenomenological structure itself. In Canale's work, 
the contribution of the subject is the interpretational framework that guides 
the creation of an image of the object, while the object contributes its lines 
of intelligibility. On the basis of his biblical-temporal interpretation of the 
phenomenological structure, the gap between the subject and object is 
annihilated. The biblical conception of Being does not allow for a dualism between 
being and appearance in the classical sense, but implies that being is 
appearance and that appearance already implies Knowledge.  Appearance 30
29H. G. Geertsema, "Dooyeweerd on Knowledge and Truth," in Ways of Knowing: In 
Concert, ed. John H. Kok (Sioux Center: Dordt College Press, 2005), 85-100.  
30Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 367. 
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implies knowledge because appearance is only appearance at the moment it 
is known, i.e., a subject-object relation exists.31 Thus knowledge does not 
need to overcome an ontological gap by means of abstraction.32 Both the 
subject's interpretational framework and the object's lines of intelligibility 
have temporal character. 
In Dooyeweerd's philosophy, knowledge is closely related to experience.  
Different experiences can be differently qualified. Nevertheless, the analytic 
aspect is present in all experience.  Knowledge does not necessarily need to 
be qualified by the analytic aspect in order to be knowledge. Because of this 
understanding, Dooyeweerd's concept of knowledge always emphasizes two 
aspects. The first aspect is that any thing, entity, event, or human is subject to 
the modal laws. Therefore, any act is characterized by all modal aspects. The 
other aspect is that all being is meaning-being and does not therefore have 
any existence in itself, but is interdependent. In the integral cosmic coherence, 
things cannot exist by themselves, but are dependent on other things to realize 
their subject- and object-functions. 
33
34
Connecting knowledge closely to experience, Dooyeweerd rejects the 
idea that analytic or logical knowing is the one true way of knowing. The 
idea that logical knowing is the only reliable way of knowing is built upon 
the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought. To Dooyeweerd, analytic 
knowing is only one valid way of knowing among many others. He explains 
that besides logical knowing, there is also social knowing or instinct, as 
knowing that is qualified by the psychic aspect. Every knowing is legitimate 
and has its purpose within meaning-being. This does not mean that all subject- 
object relations are establishing knowledge. There are also subject-object and 
subject-subject relations that have only ontic and not epistemic character. In 
his transcendental critique of theoretical thought, however, Dooyeweerd 
especially focuses on the analytic way of knowing. 
Since any kind of knowing is part  of meaning-being, there is no 
knowledge that is absolute. All knowledge is relative, and "there is no truth in 
itself.  Knowledge as the integral experience of meaning-being is therefore 
always dependent on the relation of the knowing subject to a known object. 
Any object that we "perceive is related to and dependent on our perceptual 
apparatus."  This again stresses the radical meaning of meaning-being: the 






34René van Woudenberg, "Theorie Van Het Kennen," in Kennis En Werkelijkheid, ed. René 
van Woudenberg (Amsterdam- Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1996), 34-35. 
35Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 2:577. 
36Geertsema, 89. 
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cannot fully realize itself when it is not related to an object. A further important point to 
understand about Dooyeweerd's conception of knowledge is that in the systase (i.e., 
existing in relationship together)  of the subject-object relation, the object is not a 
construction of the mind. Geertsema writes: 
37
There are actual subject-functions of the thing that are objectified in the perceptual 
image. Therefore, the objective sensory perceptual image and the subjective image of 
my perception are not identical. . . We might even say that there should be a 
correspondence between the objective perceptual state of affairs and the subjective 
perceptual image (cf. 441). The one is the norm of the other.38
Since subject and object are under the same creational law, the subject- object 
relations cannot be consumed by either objectivism or subjectivism, but have a basic 
normative character. As the logical object-function of an object is related to the 
logical subject-function, it is the responsibility of the subject to disclose the object in a 
logical concept that does justice to the logical objective-function of the object as it 
corresponds with it.39
While both thinkers agree that meaning is established by the contribution of both 
subject and object and that the subject-object relation is considered temporal and thus 
nondualisthc, Dooyeweerd's understanding of the subject- object relation and the 
distinct contribution of both sides creates a much clearer picture than Canale's. As far 
as I can see, Canale cannot be that clear in his explanation, because he has not yet 
developed an ontology that helps to explain how the subject-object relation takes place 
in the temporal horizon, and he does not introduce the biblical idea of the law to which 
all creation is bound. The latter demonstrates the strength of Dooyeweerd's 
interpretation of the subject-object relation. 
In conclusion, Canale's understanding of Reason has much in common with 
Dooyeweerd's understanding of knowledge. While Canale finds Reason to include the 
many ways of knowing, ° Dooyeweerd concentrates on an analysis of logically 
qualified knowing. 
4
3.3.1 .2 Method 
Canale does not choose a distinct religious position in his analysis of the structure 
of Reason, but works explicitly from phenomenology. Later we will return to the 
question of whether a phenomenological analysis does not in and of itself already 
imply a standpoint, rendering it nonneutral. 
37Dooyeweerd's understanding of "systase" is described in Glanz, "Part I: Dooyeweerd 
on Reason," 28. 
38Geertsema, 90. 
39Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 390-391. 
40Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspration, 132. 
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A practical advantage of a phenomenological analysis could be that it is 
likely to be more acceptable and accessible for non-Christian thinkers and 
schools of philosophy Canale clearly distinguishes between the formal 
structure of Reason and the possible interpretations thereof. This means 
that the nonneutrality of human thinking is not defended on the basis of a 
Christian interpretation of the phenomenological structure of Reason, but 
on the analysis of the phenomenology of Reason itself It does not imply 
that Canale does not have any assumptions, but only that his assumptions do 
not necessarily have a Christian background and promise to be shared by 
different philosophical schools ____ especially by those that take the subject- 
object problem as their point of departure. One such broadly acknowledged 
assumption is that knowledge is established in the structure of a subject- 
object relation. A connected assumption is that no understanding can be 
found outside of Reason. 
In opposition to Canale, Dooyeweerd chooses an expressly Christian 
starting point. This starting point finds its expression in the modal theory that 
functions as a basis for especially the second way of his transcendental critique. 
Still, the modal theory is not only based on religious beliefs, but is provided 
with substantial and persuasive philosophical arguments. Therefore, the theory 
should not be unacceptable per se to non-Christian thinkers. Nevertheless, 
Dooyeweerd's entire analysis is strongly influenced by the assumption that 
God is the only absolute sovereign and that all creation, including all faculties 
of humanity, must be understood as relative toward the creator-God. By 
means of this religious presupposition, Dooyeweerd can uncover the inner 
structure of theoretical thought and reveal that thinking always has religious 
presuppositions. 
That Dooyeweerd takes a clear ideological position in his structural 
analysis can be seen in the fact that in his whole thinking he assumes the temporal-
supratemporal-[non-Greek]timelessness framework41 and locates his entire 
critique of Western philosophy within this framework. Canale understands 
the interpretation of this framework to be the result of an act of faith whose 
content does not belong to the phenomenological structure of Reason, but to 
the interpretation of the phenomenological structure. Canale's biblical 
interpretation of the presuppositional structure of Reason, however, reveals the 
temporal-supratemporal distinction as problematic because it is nonbiblical. 
Thus Canale's understanding that a concept is basically religious on its 
transcendental level builds upon two assumptions: first, Reason is identified 
with that which makes knowledge or meaning possible, and knowledge is 
identified with that which makes the expression of meaningful words possible; 
41See Glanz, "Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason," 22, n. 58. 
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second, Reason's basic structure is the subject-object relation, since there is no 
knowledge outside of this relationship. 
One could say that Canale proceeds from a structural abstraction of the 
subject-object relationship of knowledge to the presuppositional level of 
foundational ontology Dooyeweerd's understanding of the subject matter 
builds upon the claim that thinking is not absolute, but dependent on a 
relationship with God. Here one could say that Dooyeweerd proceeds from 
the content of his religious belief in the Christian God to the presuppositional 
level of transcendental ideas. 
With this basic distinction in mind, we must clearly distinguish the 
Dooyeweerdian and Canalian use of the term "structure." To Dooyeweerd, 
the structure of thinking can only be uncovered by the radical biblical 
ground-motif of creation-fall-redemption. His structural understanding thus 
already includes a religious interpretation and is most likely not achievable 
without this religious standpoint. To Canale, the structure of any thought- 
act is not uncovered on the basis of an explicit a priori religious standpoint, 
but on the basis of a phenomenological analysis. Consequently Canale's 
uncovered structure of Reason still needs an interpretation on the basis of a 
choice on the level of foundational ontology, while Dooyeweerd's uncovered 
structure of thinking is only possible on the basis of a religious choice that 
has transcendental character. 
3.3.1.3 The Transcendental Presuppositions 
Dooyeweerd and Canale use different terms to refer to the transcendental 
presuppositions of thinking. Foundational ontology as the underlying structure 
of all three frameworks of Reason especially refers to the idea of coherence 
mediated by the conception of theos to which foundational ontology is 
attributed. In Dooyeweerd's terminology the idea of coherence is coupled 
with the ideas of origin and unity to constitute the transcendental ground idea. 
Thus, when it comes down to the idea of coherence, foundational ontology 
and transcendental ground idea seem to be equivalent. To Canale, however, 
the time-supratime-[non-Greek] timelessness framework does not refer to the 
idea of origin (which can be found in the theological framework of Reason's 
structure), but to the idea of coherence. To Canale, the idea of coherence has 
structural priority over the concept of theos/origin. This distinction is important, 
since it can be helpful to see a structural distinction between Being and origin, 
although a philosophical understanding of foundational ontology implies 
necessarily a concept of origin. Thus Canale would consider a transcendental 
ground idea that includes origin, unity, and coherence problematic, since it 
hides the important phenomenological finding that the framework of the 
theos already implies a foundational ontology As I have tried to show before, 
foundational ontology conditions the interpretation of the theological
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framework without conditioning the onticity of the origin. Dooyeweerd has a 
timeless conception of God because of a specific interpretation of Being. 
From a Canalian perspective, Dooyeweerd makes his idea of origin coappear 
with a timelessness interpretation of foundational ontology. To Dooyeweerd, 
God is beyond created time and created supratemporality, and as creator of 
time is himself timeless. Though Dooyeweerd tries to distance himself from 
the Greek conception of timelessness, it is questionable whether he really 
frees himself from the classical onto-theo-logical paradigm.42 The fact is 
that Dooyeweerd connects his understanding of God with a conception of 
timelessness. All of his thinking is attributed to this temporal-supratemporal[non-
Greek]timelessness framework. This framework represents the ground of his 
argument for coherence and unity. Dooyeweerd's interpretation of 
coherence and unity is therefore not simply rooted in the idea of origin as 
the one absolute sovereign God (which is a true biblical belief), but also in 
the timeless ground of Being that underlies this idea. This latter cannot be 
defended by biblical writings.43
Further, the ideas of coherence in Canale's foundational ontology and 
Dooyeweerd's transcendental ground idea have different degrees of complexity. The 
ideas of unity and coherence in Dooyeweerd's transcendental ground idea are 
elaborate. To Canale, the development and elaboration of Dooyeweerd's 
transcendental ideas of unity and coherence should be understood as 
developed interpretations of a basic foundational ontology. By this, I mean that 
the developed Dooyeweerdian concepts of unity and coherence belong to the 
interpretation of Canale's framework of ontology rather than to the underlying 
structure of foundational ontology. Attributing time to created reality, 
supratime to the self, and timelessness to God takes place as interpretation of 
the frameworks of Reason within timeless Being as ground. 
While the interpretation of God is partly determined by a chosen 
ground of Being, the choice for a specific theos is not. In conclusion, 
besides the presupposition.al choice for an interpretation of Being, a second 
presuppositional choice is required: a specific theos. 
42Oliver Glanz, "Time, Reason, and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, Critical 
Assessment, and Further Development of Herman Dooyeweerd's Structural Analysis of 
Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale's Phenomenological Analysis of the Structure of 
Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation" (master's thesis, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2006), 
nn. 20 and 35. 
43On this issue, see, e.g., Oscar Cullmann, "Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the 
Dead?" in Immortaliy, ed. Terence Penelhum (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973), 53-85; Thorleif 
Boman, Das Hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem Griechischen, 5, neubearb. und erw. Aufl. ed. 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 31-39, 131- 133; Canale, "Basic Elements of 
Christian Theology," §§33-40; James Muilenberg, "The Biblical View of Time," The Harvard 
Theological Review 54 (1961): 225-252.
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The different methods of analyzing theoretical thought/Reason (Christian-
philosophical versus phenomenological) can be found back in the different 
understandings of "transcendental" and "faith." Based on the slight but 
influential difference between the terms "foundational ontology" and 
"transcendental ideas," the structural need for a faith-act is differently 
interpreted. To Canale, the act of faith by the spontaneous subject is still an 
act of Reason.  To Dooyeweerd, the act of faith is beyond thinking and of 
supratemporal character, taking place in the supratemporal heart.  I have 
explained in the first article why Dooyeweerd places the starting point of 
theoretical thought outside of thought. Canale understands faith differently 
because of his universalization of Reason. Reason always functions actively 
and is present any moment we try to understand or even misunderstand. Since 
foundational ontology belongs to the structure of Reason, the structure of 
Reason also includes the transcendental primordial presupposition as ground 
for any conceptualization of theos, ontos, and the epistemic. 
44
45
The spontaneity of the subject that chooses for an interpretation of the 
ground of Being belongs to the necessary structure of Reason, since it has a 
foundational function for the generation of meaning. Faith then belongs to 
the structure of Reason, and is therefore an act of Reason.46
These different understandings of the term "faith" give birth to 
different characterizations of the term "transcendental" in the thought of 
the two thinkers. To Dooyeweerd, "transcendental" refers to that which has 
supratemporal function, while Canale understands "transcendental" as the 
necessary content of foundational ontology contributed by the act of faith. 
This content does not have to be of supratemporal origin or function, but can 
also be of temporal character, depending on which foundational ontology is 
chosen. 
At this point, we can see that Canale would understand Dooyeweerd's 
faith-act as a secondary faith-act. This is because Dooyeweerd can only arrive at 
his understanding of faith on the basis of a timeless ground of Being, 
which is the chosen content of the primary faith-act. Thus Dooyeweerd's 
understanding of faith is based on and strongly influenced by his choice of a 
distinct foundational ontology (primary faith-act). 
As Canale reveals a primordial presuppositional level that goes beyond 
the transcendental level of Dooyeweerd, I suggest there are two structurally 
distinguished faith-acts that need to take place in order to establish a theoretical 
total view on reality. In the first faith-act, content is given to foundational 
ontology, while in the second faith-act the choice for a theos (e.g., the biblical 
 
 
44Cf. Glanz, "Part 2: Canale on Reason," 226-230.  
45Glanz, "Part 1: Dooyeweerd on Reason," 31-32.  
46Glanz, "Part 2: Canale on Reason," 226-230. 
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creator-God, survival-of-the-fittest principle, physical-energy principle) is 
expressed within the chosen ground of Being. 
The awareness of this distinction in faith-acts helps to identify the 
foundational ontological structure that underlies the frameworks of theos, 
ontos, and logos and helps to criticize the foundational ontological framework 
from the perspective of the chosen theos.47
T h e  c o mp a r i so n  t h u s  f a r  sh o w s  t h a t  a  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  
phenomenological structure and the interpretation of the phenomenological 
structure helps to discern what content was given to Reason's frameworks in the 
course of interpreting them, and to criticize this content from the perspective 
of one's own interpretation of Reason's frameworks (as Dooyeweerd does). 
3.3.2 Being of God—Created Being 
of Humanity 
There are several similarities between Canale's interpretation of being and 
Dooyeweerd's understanding of meaning-being. To both Dooyeweerd and 
Canale, the biblical account does not problematize the relation between God's 
being and humanity's being. There is a difference between God's being and 
men's being, but not a gap that would make true understanding impossible. 
Therefore, neither dualism nor tension can be found in God's creation and its 
relative relation to him. 
The fact that the difference between the source of being (God) and being 
(meaning-being) is not situated in dualism is in need of explanation. Such an 
explanation is not only of religious interest, but also of philosophical interest as 
the diversity of reality needs a coherent explanation rooted in the idea of origin. 
Such an explanation can be found in the terminology of the two thinkers. 
Canale speaks of the relation between the rational ground of Being and being 
as structural relation discovered through phenomenological analysis. The 
interpretation of God's being and creational being, i.e., theology and ontology, 
can be understood as "regional" interpretations placed within universal Reason. 
Being is, however, revealed by God (in Scripture), which makes a rational 
understanding of God's being (theology) possible. Dooyeweerd speaks of 
the relation between being and meaning-being ("zin-zijn"). Both thinkers try to 
point to the continuity-discontinuity relation between God and creation 
through their terminology. Their different interpretations of the transcendence 
of God constitute the core motif of their explanations of the fundamental 
relation between God and humanity. 
In order to understand better the two approaches to this relation, I will 
summarize the classical Thomistic explanation of this relation (4.2.1) and the 
Dooyeweerdian and Canalian critique thereof (4.2.2). 
47Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 386. 
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3.3.2.1 Analogia entis 
Dooyeweerd and Canale basically agree on the following description and 
analysis of the analogia entis:48
To Thomas, the perfection of God finds its expression in his creation. 
This means that we can only grasp the eternal timeless perfection of God 
through the diversity of reality. The temporal diversity of reality as a whole 
reflects and expresses the perfection of God. On the side of time, there is 
diversity, and on the side of God's divine timelessness, there is perfection. 
In a certain sense, the diversity points to the divine perfection within time. 
There are different levels of diversity that express the perfection of God in 
different degrees. Human beings express the being of God more exactly than 
any other creatures. These varying degrees of expression are crucial for 
understanding the Thomistic analogia entis. The diversity of being is located in 
the dualistic tension between being and nonbeing. The diversity of being is 
correlated to the diversity in intensity of taking part in the divine being. Every 
level of being thus expresses the perfection of God, but can be hierarchically 
organized in terms of exactness. Lower levels of being are more distant from 
the perfection of God and head toward nothingness. 
The tension between God and nothingness forms the background of 
the classic understanding of the position of reason: the immortal soul as 
the substantial form of the body is understood as anima rationalis.  The 
anima rationalis is the closest to God and itself of timeless character. By this 
interpretation, reason received an absolutistic interpretation and position 
within the human scope of being. Reason is the central expression of 
humanity as imago dei. The absolutization of reason in classical thought and 
its accompanying dualism causes various ontological and epistemological 
problems. 
49
3.3.2.2 Ways of Overcoming 
Contrary to Thomas, both Dooyeweerd and Canale try to ground their 
philosophical understanding of the relation between God and humanity in 
Scripture (and more specifically in Exod 6).  Dooyeweerd and Canale also 
agree that a true, i.e., biblical understanding of meaning-being/being, can only 
50
48Cf. H. G. Geertsema, "Transcendentale Opeilheid: Over Het Zinkarakter Van de 
Werkelijkheid in De Wijsbegeerte Van H. Dooyeweerd," Philosophia reformata: organ van de 
Vereiging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte 35 (1970): 25-32; Canale, A Criticism of Theological 
Reason, 164-208. 
49Hans Joachim Storig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003), 288-289. 
50See Geertsema, "Transcendentale Openheid"; Canal.e, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 
285-289, 364-366. 
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be derived from an understanding of God, as he is the origin of meaning 
being/being. 
Although both choose the biblical God as the radical origin of all creation, they clearly 
differ in the characterization of God's being. Canale views Being as radically connected 
with YHWH's being in Exod 6.  He characterizes the being of God as temporal since 
in Exod 6, YHWH explains his own being within a temporal ground of Being. With 
this background, Canale arrives at his foundational ontological interpretation of Reason's 
dimensionality that is contrary to Dooyeweerd.
51
52
According to Canale, the Bible knows the being of God through the temporal 
extensions of past, present, and future. In Canale's exegetical discovery, YHWH is 
both the subject that causes the action and the object on which the action is 
accomplished.  Therefore, the appearance of God as object of his action is his 
being itself:  God's being and appearance are one and therefore express the 
covenant-trustworthiness of a personal God. There is no analogical gap between 
appearance and being as both are grounded in the same temporal ontological 
foundation.  In order to prevent misunderstanding, Canale stresses that the being-
appearance identification is presenting itself as a dynamic one within the biblical text. 
God himself is in the fire, but he is not fire. To understand this fact, new 
epistemological categories need to be developed, since all the categories we use and 





According to Canale's interpretation of the phenomenological structure of 
Reason, the epistemological framework needs to be understood within temporality. 
This idea seems to harmonize with Dooyeweerd's conclusion that thinking is of 
nonsupratemporal character, bound to the horizon of time. Still, Canale characterizes 
the temporal-cognitive process differently as he disconnects it from a supratemporal 
heart. To Canale, the human soul/heart is as temporal as the self's thinking. In order to 
discover the meaning of the temporally extended subject matter, cognition must go 
through a "tension" (gathering) process. The classical idea of the analogia entis is 
overcome, as there is nothing behind the phenomenon: the phenomenon is everything, 
Only the coappearance of Being enables God, man, and other entities to appear. The 
denial of the analogia entis idea does not refuse an analogical procedure, but calls for a 
redefinition. The choice for a temporal dimensionality of Reason will lead to the 
concept that the analogical procedure does not require a 
51Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 373. 
52Ibid., 338. 
53This is expressed in the Hebrew use of the reflective Nifal verb. 54Cf. 
Glanz, "Part 2: Canale on Reason," 235-236. 
55Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 358-359. 
56Ibid., 361-362.
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discontinuity with the intelligibility of what is given in the temporal realm of 
appearances, but does require the continuity of the meaning and intelligibility of 
what is given in the temporal realm of appearances with what is beyond the 
moment of presence, i.e., the temporal extension of being (past and future 
appearances). Consequently, the continuity between the relation of God and 
creation is found within time. 
According to Dooyeweerd, the term "being" does not exist in the 
Thomistic way of understanding. To Dooyeweerd, the term "being" only 
exists as Being, i.e., only as God's Being. All creation exists as meaning, not as 
being. This idea is connected to the biblical idea that Being  is only expressed 
in relation to YHWH and his revelation of the meaning of his name. Being is 
therefore understood as "zelfgenoegzaamheid" (self-satisfaction). Meaning is 
understood as relative and "onzelfgenoegzame" (not self-satisfied) meaning-
being.  Thus Dooyeweerd does not create a single terminology to describe the 
existence of God and the reality of creation. He does not locate the cause of 
meaning-being in the being of God as such, but in his will. Thus Dooyeweerd 
seems to try to place the problem of continuity and discontinuity in a realm 





This strategy suggests that the analogia entis no longer needs to bridge 
an ontological discontinuity. Nevertheless, the problem is not solved while 
the answer to the question of how we can come to an understanding of 
God remains completely mysterious. First, one might ask whether knowledge 
of God's will is itself not already knowledge about God's being. Second, 
there is the question of how an understanding of God is possible, if there is 
no basic naive conception of God's onticity. Such a naive understanding of 
God is crucial if Christian theoretical thought is to be possible. This 
question seems to lead Dooyeweerd back to a basic temporal ontological 
discontinuity between creator and creation in the end. This discontinuity finds 
expression in the importance of the time-supratimejnon-Greek]timelessness 
framework that functions as the presupposition of his modal theory in his 
New Critique.  Still, this ontological discontinuity between God and man is 
not bridged by analogy, as Dooyeweerd argues for the radical dependence of all 
creation on God. Dooyeweerd solves the problem by placing the center of humanity 
in the heart and not in an anima rationalis.  Biblical understanding 
60
61
57"Being" in this context should not be confused with Canale's use of the term. To Canale, 
"Being" is not equivalent to "existence." Cf. Glanz, "Part 2: Canale on Reason," §1.2.3. 
58Geertsema, "Transcentale Openheid," 39. 
59Ibid., 53. 
60Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. 
61F1. Dooyeweerd, "Het Tijdsprobleem in De Wigsbegeerte Der Wetsidee," 
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places the heart beyond any anima rationalis.62 Making the anima 
rationalis the center of humanity stems from an absolutization of rational 
capacity, which contradicts the biblical conception of relative and radically 
dependent creation, contradicts the biblical teaching of the all-encompassing 
fallenness of humanity, including the heart, and ignores-the heart that is the 
center of human individuality and identity 
Since Dooyeweerd identifies the heart with supratemporality and 
supramodality, he is able to prevent reductionistic tendencies when it shares in 
the biblical starting point of the only sovereign and independent God. By 
identifying the heart with supratemporality, Dooyeweerd needs to reinterpret 
the analogical idea as having temporal instead of supratemporal character. 
To Dooyeweerd, analogies were mistakenly used in classical thought to 
bridge the time-timelessness gap. In contrast, Dooyeweerd uses analogy to 
create inner coherence between the temporal diversity of modalities. These 
analogical moments do not bridge the gap between time and timelessness, 
but between the different modalities within time. Thomas, in contrast, uses 
analogy to relate the continuity and discontinuity between creation and 
creator. 
We have seen that the critique of Dooyeweerd and Canale on the 
analogical understanding of Thomas does not destroy, but redefines analogical 
terminology. In the redefinition of analogical moments, Dooyeweerd and 
Canale, however, lose their conformity Dooyeweerd's critique targets 
the Thomistic misinterpretation of cosmic time, which is most centrally 
expressed in his idea that the human heart is the root-unity  of created 
reality The two aspects, cosmic time and the heart as supratemporal root- 
unity, are the central focus of his critique. Canale focuses his critique of the 
analogical understanding much more on the time-timelessness framework 
that created the ontological gap between God and creation in the first place. If 
a biblical philosophy is to be developed, a reinterpretation of the relation 
between time and timelessness is not needed, but rather a reinterpretation 
of foundational ontology. Thus, while Dooyeweerd accepts the timeless 
interpretation of foundational ontology but reinterprets and modifies it in 
regard to the relation between creator and creation, Canale sees the need for a 
fully new foundational ontology that does justice to the biblical conception of 
God and thereby eliminates the specific ontological gap. 
63
Both Dooyeweerd and Canale understand the classical epistemological 
problem as being ontological in nature. They, however, solve this ontological 
Philosophia reformata: organ van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte 5 (1940): 180- 
182. 
62Geertsema, "Transcendentale Openheid," 10. 
63Glanz, "Part 1" Dooyeweerd on Reason," 22-23, 23-25.
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problem in different ways. Further, both argue that the concentration point 
and coherence of the ontic diversity is found in the thinking subject. 
3.3.3 Understanding of the 
Subject-Object Relation
Dooyeweerd and Canale agree that the classical idea of correspondence 
between knowing and being is problematic, since its underlying metaphysical 
conception assumes a gap between subject and object.64 The two thinkers 
locate the classical motives to problematize the subject-object relation, i.e., to 
recognize an ontological gap between subject and object, in presuppositions 
that were adopted by classical thinkers (cf. 1.3.1.1). Canale locates it in 
the classical timeless ground of Being, while Dooyeweerd locates it in the 
different unbiblical ground-motives that are characterized by the dogma of 
the autonomy of theoretical thought. The autonomy of theoretical thought 
leads to absolutizations of different possible Gegenstand-relations and 
misinterpretations of the modal kernel of the Gegenstand and its analogical 
relations as representing the content of transcendental ideas. Because of this 
the Gegenstand-relation has been mistaken for the subject-object relation in 
the history of philosophy. This led to the lack of awareness that theoretical 
thinking—being crucially different from naive thinking—has a necessarily 
religious starting point. 
Because Dooyeweerd and Canale see that meaning-being/being always 
encompasses theoretical knowing/knowing, the theory of correspondence 
between knowing and being in its classical metaphysical sense is not acceptable. 
They come to similar conclusions by different arguments. Dooyeweerd grounds 
his argumentation in his ontology Based on his modal theory, Dooyeweerd 
knows that theoretical and pretheoretical thought are always characterized 
by cosmic time. The analytic aspect does not have a supraposition in regard 
to the diversity of modalities, but is itself a part thereof. Analytic thinking 
is therefore one aspect of meaning-being and thus cannot correspond with 
being. Further, the conception of reality that undergirds the correspondence 
theory is contrary to Dooyeweerd's philosophy. As explained, in our naive 
state of being, we experience the subject-object or subject-subject relations 
integrally intertwined. Things do exist in relationship (systasis). Things cannot 
exist by themselves: this would contradict the central character of meaning- 
6 4Canale puts emphasis on the fact  that  f rom a rational perspect ive the 
adherents of the correspondence theory have overcome most of the epistemological 
problems and provide coherent explanations. Therefore, Canale does not consider 
the correspondence theory as necessarily problematic from a rational perspective, 
but from the perspective of biblical ontological and dimensionality. To him, it is not 
necessary to challenge the coherence of viability of classical or modern philosophy, 
but to point out that they have difficulties to integrate the phenomena and claims of 
Scripture. See Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 127. 
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being. Creation as meaning-being is defined as expressing radical dependence on its 
creator as relative being, and expressing inner interdependence and therefore 
uniformity in being subject to the same law.65 Canale arrives at the conclusion that 
Being encompasses knowing without depending on an ontology. To him, the 
interrelation between Being and knowing is a structural necessity uncovered by the 
phenomenological analysis. 
In contrast to Dooyeweerd, Canale shows that metaphysical 
abstractions like "form and matter," "grace and nature," or "freedom and nature" are 
necessarily determined by the presuppositional acceptance of a timeless 
dimensionality of Reason. Flowing from timeless Being, the time- timeless dualism as 
a basic framework of Reason has often functioned as an interpretative tool of 
philosophical thinking. Identifying the two poles has led to different absolutizations. 
The timeless conception has often been identified with reason and the 
existentiality of emotions. In the case of such identification, an idea of reality in 
itself was considered attainable by rational or emotional abstraction. In the absence 
of such identification, knowledge or reality in itself was considered unattainable. 
This conclusion was only possible because of the distinction between reality in itself 
and reality as it appears, which is based on the timeless dimensionality of 
Reason. Consequently, in Canak's critique there are two levels that account for the 
dualism within the subject-object relation: the chosen dimensionality of Reason that 
opens the structural possibility for dualistic interpretations, and the content of the 
different dualistic interpretations, varying in terms of which human faculty (if any at 
all) is identified with the realm of timelessness. To Canale, a biblical-temporal 
interpretation of the ground of Being negates the idea of a metaphysical thing in 
itself. 
Dooyeweerd shares Canale's second level. In fact, as Dooyeweerd is not laying 
bare the foundational ontological level, but concentrates much more on the different 
interpretations of the time-timeless framework, he offers a more detailed 
understanding of the necessary interpretational act in which a supratemporal 
standpoint is sought. He argues that any abstraction that identifies something modal 
with supratemporality has its roots in the logical Gegenstand-relation that assumes 
thought itself to be supratemporal and therefore interprets the logical analogies 
within the modal diversity as the essence of reality. Since he connects the dichotomy 
of "reality in itself" and "reality as it appears" to the absolutization of something 
temporal, thereby rendering it supratemporal, he locates the problem much more in 
this idealization than in the time-timeless framework. The question here is whether a 
new identification with the supratemporal realm, as Dooyeweerd proposes in the form 
of the human heart, will really solve the dualistic problem of the subject-object 
relation. If it is possible to solve the subject- 
65Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 1:4. 
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object dualism within a timeless ground of Being, a temporal dimensionality of 
Reason as a solution to the classical and modern subject-object problem 
would not be needed. Canale's argument that the time-timeless dichotomy is 
the cause of dualism would consequently be tremendously weakened. But to 
demonstrate that the subject-object problem is solved, Dooyeweerdian 
thinking would need to prove that the reidentification of the supratemporal 
with the human heart makes all dualism disappear.66 Not only the classical 
chorismos between subject and object would need to be overcome, but also 
the chorismos between man and God that prevents a true understanding of 
temporal reality as it appears. I personally think that the latter problem will 
hardly be solvable if Dooyeweerdian thinking will hold on to its belief that 
thought and experience are temporal, the heart supratemporal, and God 
timeless.67 But even if theoretically a dualism in Dooyeweerd's philosophy 
could be overcome, it does not necessarily mean that it proves to be biblical. In 
any case, Canale would stress that a truly biblical philosophy needs to work 
on the basis of a temporal dimensionality of Reason and establish a theory 
that does not overcome dualism within a time-timeless setting, but within a 
biblical-temporal setting. Christian philosophy does not accomplish its task 
when it reinterprets the widely accepted timeless interpretation of Being, 
but needs to be more fundamentally critical by investigating whether timeless 
Being is representing biblical foundational ontology at all. Canale can agree with 
Dooyeweerd's understanding of the erroneous absolutization or 
supratemporalization of the temporal, but he reaches beyond by challenging 
the very assumption that there is both a temporal and supratemporal world. 
After having shown that Dooyeweerd and Canale argue against the 
autonomy of rational thinking, it can easily be pointed out that because 
they view Reason/theoretical thinking as being encompassed by being/ 
Being, they agree that there is no absolute world and therefore no absolute 
knowledge.  Accordingly, both thinkers reject the idea of truth as agreement 
between thought and being. This rejection is based on the fact that such a 
definition implies a "thing in itself" that is timeless and requires a cognitive 
faculty that is able to participate in the supratemporal world in order to be 
68
66There is reason to doubt that there is not a dualism between the supratemporal "heart" and 
the temporal "body" remaining (see Gerrit Glas, "Filosofische Antropologie," in Kennis En 
Werkelijkheid: Tweede Inleiding Tot Een Christelikjke Filosofie, ed. René van Woudenberg, 
Verantwoording [Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, Kok, 1996], 109, 114-121). Further, one 
might wonder if the discontinuity between theoretical thinking and naive thinking (the latter 
does not abstract from temporal coherence, the first does) is not a relict of classical-dualistic 
thinking. 
67That there is a dualistic problem that would need to be worked out more clearly in order to 
be able to address it distinctively can be seen in the unclear explanation of how biblical revelation 
is communicated supratemporally to the human heart. 
68Geertsema, "Dooyeweerd on Knowledge and Truth," 85-86. 
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known. If absoluteness is therefore understood as timeless and immutable, 
both Dooyeweerd and Canale see the need to reject the idea of absolute 
knowledge. 
3.3.4 Application of Analysis 
The application of the analysis of Dooyeweerd and Canale shows that 
they agree that philosophy has an important role in setting the stage for 
any scientific discipline. Philosophy is concerned with the interpretation of 
systematism and matrix (Canale) or the theoretical construction of reality in 
its totality (Dooyeweerd). Since any scientific discipline shares a system/total 
view on reality that largely determines the outcome of understanding, the 
discipline that addresses this level is most essential. 
Dooyeweerd's analysis of theoretical thinking is much more persuasive in 
its application than Canale's. The three transcendental ideas prove to be 
helpful hermeneutical tools to uncover the presuppositional level of scientific 
theories and philosophies. 
Further, with help of the modal theory, the individual sovereignty of 
different scientific disciplines can more easily be justified. To Canale, such 
justification,  on the basis of his understanding of "method" is rather 
difficult, even though he emphasizes that a structural variety of methods is 
needed to do justice to the diversity of objects and subject matters. This 
difficulty exists because his formal structure of Reason does not allow for a 
classification of the many possible subject matters. Such a classification 
would demand an ontology. An ontology is necessary to differentiate between 
naive and theoretical thinking in terms of the subject-object relationship 
and Gegenstand-relation. The development thereof would help to distinguish 
different classifications of subject matters and objects. The current state of 
development of Canale's structure of Reason finds its best application in the 
discipline of Christian theology, where it is often the different groundings 
of the concept of God that generate different theological understandings. 
However, I believe that Canale's application of the structure of Reason can 
also be a great analytical tool in the realm of the humanities. Canale's analysis 
cannot yet be of much value to the natural sciences, as it does not yet include a 
developed ontology. 
In the Christian perspective of both Dooyeweerd and Canale, it is God 
who provides through revelation the starting point of philosophy. Humanity 
in its spontaneity (Canale) or freedom (Dooyeweerd) is not determined 
to choose this specific starting point, but is determined to make a specific 
choice that functions as the starting point. The consequences of rejecting the 
Christian starting point are characterized differently by the two thinkers. In 
Dooyeweerd's modal theory, any nonbiblical starting point will raise antinomies. In 
contrast, Canale does see the possibility that many different interpretations
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of Reason are all coherent. I think this contrast stems from Canale's neglect in 
distinguishing between meaning and the rational expression of Meaning. I 
agree with Canale that there are many different or even opposing expressions of 
Meaning possible that are coherent. However, not all expressions of 
Meaning equally correspond to the experience of Meaning. I will come back to 
this point in my critique in the forthcoming fourth article. 
3.4 Summary 
On the  bas is  of  Dooyeweerd ' s  and Canale ' s  d i f ferent  ana lyses  of  
presuppositions and a comparison of their thinking, we can see that Canale's 
analysis and biblical interpretation of the phenomenological structure 
provides a perspective to criticize Dooyeweerd's presuppositions. On the 
other hand, Dooyeweerd's modal theory is helpful for critically examining 
Canale's understanding of Meaning. In addition, the value of Dooyeweerd in 
contributing to a further development of the interpretation of Canale's 
frameworks of Reason lies in his inspiring modal theory, the clear distinction 
between theoretical and naïve thinking, and the central role given to the 
heart. 
The fourth and last article will be dedicated to an integration of both 
thinkers into a meaningful system after a critique has revealed the weak or 
incomplete aspects of Dooyeweerd's and Canale's analysis and application 
thereof.
